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16 Maverick: Experimentally Testing a
Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities
Abstract: Antitrust authorities all over the world are keen on the presence of a partic-
ularly aggressive competitor, a “maverick”. Yet there is a lack of theoretical justifica-
tion. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick
derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pre-
test, we classify participants by their social value orientation. Individuals who are ri-
valistic in an allocation task indeed bid more aggressively in a laboratory oligopoly
market. This disciplines incumbents. We conclude that the existence of rivalistic atti-
tudes may justify antitrust policies that protect mavericks.
16.1 Introduction
One man’s meat is another man’s poison, as they say. Antitrust is a field of applica-
tion. For those forming a cartel, or coordinating tacitly, collusion is a dilemma.
Individually, each is best off if the others are faithful cartelists, while this one firm
undercuts price, or exceeds the quota for that matter. However, if cartelists succeed
to coordinate, this has negative external consequences for consumers. Antitrust au-
thorities are therefore pleased to learn that one supplier in a market is particularly
aggressive. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines have coined the graphic term
“maverick” for such firms. The Guidelines describe such firms as “firms that are un-
usually disruptive and competitive influences in the market”.1 The European Horizontal
Merger Guidelines express the same concern.2
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In the next section, we review the case law and the (rather small) economic lit-
erature on maverick behavior. In this paper, we focus on one potential source of
aggressive market behavior that has gotten short shrift. Market participants might
bid aggressively because they hold particularly competitive preferences. They might
derive utility from getting a higher payoff than their peers. In this sense, our study
looks at macro-level implications of individual social preferences and thus builds on
most of the literature, which asserts that such preferences exist in the field (see refer-
ences in Ockenfels et al. 2015).
A preference-based explanation for aggressive market behavior, and its effect on
the behavior of other market participants, would be hard to study in the field, if not
impossible, though. This is why our study is conducted in a controlled laboratory en-
vironment, despite the inevitable wedge between our object of interest (the behavior
of firms in a product market) and our object of study (the behavior of students in a
laboratory market); we further discuss external validity in the concluding section.
Social preferences are assumed to be personality traits. Personality traits cannot
be induced on the spot, but they can be measured. We proceed in two steps. In a first
experiment, we classify participants by their social value orientation (Liebrand and
McClintock 1988). We select those participants with the most rivalistic social value
orientation to be entrants in the second, main experiment. For 10 periods entrants
observe how two participants randomly selected from a pool with less extreme social
value orientation choose quantities in a duopoly market. We investigate whether the
behavior of incumbents, and market outcomes, differ according to the social value
orientation of the entrant.
Our main hypothesis is supported with a proviso. Conditional on local market
conditions, firms perform worse on average, and consumer welfare increases, if the
market entrant is classified as rivalistic. Yet local conditions matter. In particular,
rivalistic entrants do not make the market more competitive if competition was al-
ready fierce in the first place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 defines our contribu-
tion to the legal and economic literature. Section 3 presents the design of the experi-
ment and our hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results from the main experiment.
Section 5 concludes with discussion.
16.2 Mavericks in practice and in economics
The concept of mavericks has led to a rather rich case law. In United States vs.
ALCOA, government sued ALCOA for divestiture of the acquisition of Rome Cable
Corporation. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition constituted monopoliza-
tion, on the argument that “Rome was an aggressive competitor” (377 U.S. 271 [281]
(1964)). Likewise, in Mahle GmbH, the Federal Trade Commission forced Mahle
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GmbH to divest Metal Leve’s United States piston business on the argument that,
before the merger, Metal Leve was “an aggressive and innovative competitor” (62
Fed.Reg. 10,566 [10,567] (1997)). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
opposed the acquisition by Alcan Aluminium Corp. of Pechiney Rolled Products,
LLC, since this would “remove a low cost, aggressive, and disruptive competitor in
the North American brazing sheet market” (Case No. 1:03CV02012, para. 21 (2003)).3
Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission opposed the proposed merger of Staples, Inc.
with Office Depot, Inc., on the argument that the merger would eliminate a “particularly
aggressive competitor in a highly concentrated market” (Case No. 1:97CV00701, sec. IV
A 2 (1997)). These decision are echoed by legal doctrine (Baker 2002; Kolasky 2002).
The European antitrust authorities have taken similar decisions. The European
Commission cleared the merger of T-Mobile Austria with tele.ring only after the parties
committed to selling major assets of tele.ring to an independent competitor. This under-
taking was requested, although the new merged unit would not be the largest supplier
in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile communication services to end cus-
tomers since, before the merger, “for the last three years, tele.ring has played by far the
most active role on the market in practising successfully a price aggressive strategy”
(case M.3916, O.J. L 88/2007, 44, para. 10). Likewise the Commission cleared the merger
of Linde with BOC only after both firms committed to selling a number of major supply
contracts concerning helium. This removed the Commission’s original concern that,
otherwise, Linde would stop “compet[ing] aggressively to expand its position on this
market” (case M.4141, IP/06/737 (2006)). An interesting case is Euler Hermes/OEKB.
Through the merger, the new unit reaches a share between 45 and 55% on the
Austrian market for delcredere insurance. The Commission nonetheless does not see
reason for concern, one counter argument being that an independent new entrant
Atradius “has assumed the role of a maverick by its aggressive pricing policy and its
increase of sales” (case M.4990, para. 29, 2008).4
There is also empirical data suggesting that mavericks exist, and that they can
substantially change market behavior. One study compares prices for retail gas in
the otherwise comparable metropolitan areas of Ottawa and Vancouver. In both re-
gions, tacit collusion would be equally feasible. Yet data from Internet price data
collection sites show that, in the Ottawa region, prices are much more dispersed
and volatile. This market outcome can be traced back to the presence of a maverick
(Eckert and West 2004a, b). Maverick behavior has also been identified in the
Australian mortgage market (Breunig and Menezes 2008). Another illustration is be-
havior in the Dutch spectrum auction in 2000 (Van Damme 2003, see also Klemperer
2004). There were five incumbents and five licenses for sale, but several potential en-
trants. As Van Damme (2003) emphasized, the Dutch telecom regulator “hinted at
3 http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201303.pdf.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4990_20080305_20310_de.pdf.
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the desirability to favor newcomers to the market in the auction”, and that “there are
several reasons why a new entrant might be a more aggressive player on the market”.
However, all but one potential entrant (Versatel) actually partnered with an incum-
bent bidder, removing them from the auction market. One of the incumbents (Telfort)
later, during the auction, accused Versatel of particularly aggressive bidding behav-
iors. As Van Damme (2003:285) reports: “Telfort claims that Versatel is bidding only
to raise its rivals’ costs or to get concessions from them.” (Cramton and Ockenfels
2017 make a related point in the context of Germany’s 4G auction.)
That said, there is a gap between the practice of dealing with mavericks in com-
petition policy and the economics of mavericks in theory. Simple economic explan-
ations of why some firms are more competitive than others would include that
mavericks have lower costs, are incentivized by sales volumes, or control more ca-
pacities than their competitors. All this would imply that mavericks have a rather
large market share. Yet, as Breunig and Menezes (2008) pointed out, competition
authorities often stress that mavericks are, in fact, likely to be small firms (which
seems to make it more plausible that personality traits of managers play a role in
the phenomenon of mavericks). This might follow from pronounced switching cost,
which forces entrants to be particularly aggressive (Farrell and Klemperer 2007),
from more pronounced discounting of future earnings by firms in financial distress
(Busse 2002), or from the fact that fixed cost is high in the industry (Scherer and
Ross 1990). Yet another, underexplored source of aggressive behavior is behavioral.
Some, but not all, decision makers like to be ahead, and dislike being behind. It is
this source we are studying in this paper.
Our approach resonates with the New Zealand Merger Guidelines. In their sec-
tion 7.2, the guidelines explicitly list “features associated with a maverick”. Most
features relate to a behavioral tendency to disrupt coordination and similar phe-
nomena, including the first feature (“a history of aggressive, independent pricing
behavior”) and the last feature (“a history of independent behavior generally”).5 In
the same spirit, Kwoka (1989) adds a firm specific degree of conjectural variation in
quantity choices to a fully symmetric Cournot model.
In the US the focus on “maverick” firms has come under attack. Antitrust au-
thorities have been urged to put less weight on the issue, mostly because there is so
little theoretical foundation in economics.6 However, in our view, the normative de-
bate of the role of mavericks would benefit if it were to adopt a more adequate con-
cept of competitive behavior. Individuals strongly differ with respect to social
behavior, including their competitiveness, willingness to cooperate or collude, and
5 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/assets/Imported-from-old-site/BusinessCompetition/
MergersAcquisitions/ClearanceProcessGuidelines/ContentFiles/Documents/Mergers-and-
AcquisitionsGuidelines-2003.pdf, accessed 1 January 2014.
6 Personal communication by the chief economist of the German Cartel Authority, Konrad Ost.
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ability to coordinate. In fact, individual heterogeneity in social and economic inter-
action is one of the most robust insights from behavioral economics and psychology
(e.g. Camerer 2003). Thus, heterogeneity of social preferences may be one important
missing link between antitrust practice and economic theory when it comes to un-
derstanding the presence of mavericks.7
There are many ways of modeling social preferences (for a survey see Cooper
and Kagel 2016). Many models include a concern about relative, not only absolute
payoff. Such models describe, for instance, inequity averse players (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) or rivalistic players, who are willing to
trade some absolute payoff against a sufficiently higher relative payoff (Fouraker
and Siegel 1963: chapter 9; Bolton 1991; Frank 1984; Bazerman, Loewenstein, and
White 1992; Messick and Thorngate 1967). These models resonate with an extended
literature in social psychology on the “desire to win” (for a summary see Malhotra
2010). There is pronounced heterogeneity with respect to this desire (De Dreu and
Boles 1998; Van Lange et al. 1997). The desire to win can lead to bidding more in an
auction than the item is worth (Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2005) and to engage
in costly litigation rather than settling a case (Malhotra, Ku, and Murnighan 2008).
Rivalistic behavior is also sometimes characterized as status seeking (Frank
1985; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008) and backed by solid experimental evidence
(Ball and Eckel 1998; Huberman, Loch, and Önçüler 2004; Charness, Masclet, and
Villeval 2013) and evidence from the field (Solnick and Hemenway 1998; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Boes, Staub, and Winkelmann 2010). The concept of
status seeking has explicitly been extended to market behavior (Sobel 2009), en-
trepreneurial risk-taking (Clemens 2006) and managing a firm (Auriol and Renault
2008). Status seeking has been shown to affect behavior in experimental markets
(Ball et al. 2001) and experimental supply chains (Loch and Wu 2008). In the field,
status plays a strong role in motivating managers (Ockenfels, Sliwka, and Werner
2014; Grund and Martin 2017).
The only experimental study of “maverick” behavior we are aware of has been
conducted by Li and Plott (2009). The paper studies which interventions can break
tacit collusion in a laboratory market with 8 participants who hold exogenously
given, different valuations for 8 items. The first part of their experiment continues
until the group colludes perfectly. One of the interventions, which the authors re-
late to the anti-trust concept of a maverick, consists of confidentially changing the
valuations of 2 items for the duration of 2 periods. As desired, participants with
higher valuations, who have been induced to bid more aggressively, start bidding
for the item in question. Some other participants retaliate, which leads to a price
7 Of course, other areas of industrial organization have already been substantially influenced by
behavioral research; see, e.g., Engel (2007) for the insights from experimental economics for the
determinants of tacit collusion.
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war. Yet after a while, collusion is again established (Li and Plott 2009: 444). Our
approach complements their study in various important ways. We mention two
points here. First, we study the effects of aggressive quantity choices resulting from
personality. That is, our study does not induce aggressive behavior by confidentially
changing monetary incentives, but rather focuses on the potential of naturally oc-
curring heterogeneity in social motivation to capture maverick behavior. Indeed,
because in our context all payoff functions and market conditions are identical and
common knowledge across subjects, heterogeneous individual traits are the only
possible cause for treatment effects in our experiment. Second, we investigate the
effect of “maverick” behavior in markets that, endogenously, have produced differ-
ent degrees of competition. As we will see, our variables of interest matter: market
outcomes can be related to natural psychological traits of traders, and the impact of
maverick behavior interacts with idiosyncratically evolved market competitiveness.
Our paper also makes a contribution to the experimental literature on social di-
lemmas. To the best of our knowledge, no experiment has tried to explain outcomes
in oligopoly markets with the social preferences of participants (cf. the theory paper
by İriş and Santos-Pinto 2014). This is surprising given competition can be modelled
as a dilemma, and choices in dilemma games are routinely rationalized with the
social preferences of participants (for a survey see Chaudhuri 2011). We do not only
derive hypotheses from participants’ social preferences, but even build our treat-
ment manipulation on randomly composing markets conditional on participants’
social preferences.
16.3 Design of the experiment and hypotheses
In order to test the effect of heterogeneous preferences on competition we first clas-
sify participants according to their social value orientation in a pre-test, using the
standard procedure introduced by Liebrand and McClintock (1988). This test has
participants repeatedly choose between two different allocations of a sum to be dis-
tributed between an anonymous partner and themselves. They are, for instance,
asked whether they prefer 354 units for themselves and an anonymous counterpart
over 397 units for themselves and 304 units for the counterpart. Aggregating over
all 32 incentivized choices, for each individual one defines a score, which is custom-
arily called the “ringdegree” since the measure can be represented on a circle.
Participants with a score of 0 only care about their own payoff. Participants with a
positive score are willing to give up some payoff for themselves for the sake of giving
their anonymous partner a higher payoff. Such participants are averse against advan-
tageous inequity, consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). We are particularly interested in participants with a negative score. They are
willing to give up some payoff for themselves in the interest of increasing the payoff
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difference between themselves and their partner. These participants are rivalistic.
They hold a positive willingness to pay for improving their status.
In the main experiment, we form fixed markets of three suppliers to interact in
a fully symmetric Cournot market over 20 rounds. In the first 10 rounds, only two
suppliers, the incumbents, are active. Every round, the passive supplier, the en-
trant, is informed about price and total quantity. This participant only enters the
market in round 11. This procedure allows the entrant to observe the market before
entering, which seems reasonable for any potential entrant. The social value orien-
tation of the entrant is our treatment variable. We have rivalistic entrants, selfish
entrants, and entrants who are averse against advantageous inequity. This design
reflects the fact that social value orientation, as a personality trait, is not open to ad
hoc manipulation. The trait can only be measured, and participants can be matched
by the trait. While we are not aware of experiments that have used this approach
for social value orientation, it is, for instance, common if one uses gender, age or
race as treatment variables (for references in dictator game experiments see, for ex-
ample, Engel 2011).
We emphasize that, with the design of the experiment, we do not identify the
effect of the presence or absence of a maverick on competition. What we measure is
the effect of a change in the structure of the market through the market entry of a
maverick. We are thus testing a dynamic, not a static effect (on this distinction see
Engel 2016), akin to the distinction between stocks and flows. We have chosen this
research question for reasons of external validity. Antitrust, and merger control in
particular, have been primarily interested in preserving the competition enhance-
ment resulting from such market entry.
The social value orientation test is run a couple of days before the market ex-
periment. Participants are invited on the understanding that a second experiment is
to follow, but are not informed about the nature of the second experiment. To make
matching in the main experiment possible, but preserve anonymity, we use the fol-
lowing procedure: at the end of the pre-test, participants themselves generate an
identification code. Participants write this code on a card, put this card into an en-
velope, seal the envelope and write their name on it. The closed envelopes go to the
lab manager. The manager opens them and writes a list that matches names and
codes. The experimenter prepares a list with groups to be invited for the main ex-
periment. In this list, participants are only identified by their code. The lab manager
does not learn any choices participants have made, neither in the pre-test nor,
later, in the main experiment. The lab manager only knows who shall be invited for
which session. The experimenter never sees the list that matches codes and names.
At the outset of the main experiment, participants identify themselves on the com-
puter screen by their code. The program checks whether the invited participants are
present.
Participants are completely informed about this procedure. They also know
that the experiment has two parts, and may therefore infer that information from
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the pre-test is used for inviting participants to one of the sessions of the main experi-
ment. Yet participants neither know the nature of the main experiment, nor which
information is used for matching (we run a battery of further personality tests the re-
sults of which are of no relevance for the main experiment; their only purpose is mak-
ing it difficult for participants to infer which personality trait is used for matching).8
In particular, subjects are neither informed about behavior in the first experiment nor
about social value scores of other participants; in the field, too, other firms usually
only observe their competitors’ behavior, not their preferences or decision making
process.
In the main experiment, participants interact in fixed groups of three. The main
experiment has two parts.9 At the outset, participants only receive instructions for
the first part. They are informed that more parts are to follow, and that new instruc-
tions will be distributed for the continuation. The first part of the main experiment
has 10 rounds. In this part of the experiment, two incumbents of each group have
the active role. The entrant has the passive role. Incumbents are not told that the
third participant will later enter the market. This design feature is meant to capture
the situation when maverick behavior is most important for antitrust: an outsider
observes whether aggressive market behavior is likely to be profitable. (We note,
however, that being worried about entry could have led to stronger competition
and thus reduce the effect of a maverick entrant.) Incumbents compete in a Cournot
market where the profit of incumbent i in period t is given by (16.1).
πit = 100− qit − qjt
 
qit (16:1)
We thus assume demand to be linear and normalize cost to zero. After each period,
incumbents learn the resulting price and their individual profit. Entrants learn total
quantity supplied and the price. After the end of period 10 there is a (surprise) re-
start of the market. Now entrants become active as well, so that the profit function
changes to (16.2).
πit = 100− qit − qjt − qkt
 
qit (16:2)
The second part of the experiment also lasts 10 periods.
8 In the pre-test, we had the following sequence of tests: social value orientation; risk preferences
(Holt/Laury); belief elicitation on 4 problems from the test for social value orientation; Big5 person-
ality inventory (short 10 item version); 4 unincentivized questions about trust taken from the
German socio-economic panel; basic demographic information.
9 Plus a third part meant to test a theoretical prediction that buyouts of the entrant will not occur,
which has been confirmed in our data. However, because this is only of secondary importance for
our results, we decided to drop this part altogether. We refer interested readers to the working
paper version of this article for more details.
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Based on the results of the pre-test, three groups of participants are selected to
have the entrant role in the main experiment: Those 9 participants with the most
negative social value orientation score have the entrant role in the Negative treat-
ment. These participants are rivalistic. We form two different comparison groups: 11
participants with a social value orientation score of zero have the entrant role in the
Zero treatment. These participants are selfish. Those 11 participants with the highest
positive social value orientation score have the entrant role in the Positive treat-
ment. The remaining participants are randomly assigned to have the incumbent
role in either treatment. Three of them have a mildly negative social value orienta-
tion score. 16 of them are selfish. 40 have a mildly positive social value orientation
score.10
We have 9 groups (27 participants) in the Negative treatment, and 11 groups (33
participants) in the remaining two treatments. Participants are invited using the
software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 52% of participants are female. Average age is 25.45
years.11 Participants, most of whom are students, hold various majors. The experi-
ment is programmed using the software zTree (Fischbacher 2007). It is run in the
Bonn EconLab. In the pre-test, participants on average earn 13.20€ (16.05$ on the
days of the experiment). In the main experiment, they on average earn 9.36€.12
We can straightforwardly compute our null hypothesis under the standard as-
sumption that all suppliers maximize their individual payoffs. There is a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy for each phase of the experiment,13 condi-
tional on the number of suppliers in the market, which is given by qi = 100n+ 1, where n
is the number of suppliers. Plugging in the respective market size, we get our null
hypothesis
H0: Participants’ social preferences for competitiveness do not affect market outcomes; only
market size matters.
For our alternative hypothesis, assume that there is some heterogeneity of preferences.
In particular, assume that the entrant is a maverick, competing more aggressively than
10 The fact that three participants with a negative social value orientation score are incumbents
results from a mistake of the lab manager. Since the lab manager did not know their social value
orientation scores, these participants were randomly assigned to one of the groups. For five incum-
bents we do not know the social value orientation score. These subjects replaced invited partici-
pants who did not show up.
11 From the five replacement subjects, we do not have demographic information since the demo-
graphic questionnaire was part of the first experimental battery.
12 The tasks participants face in both parts of the experiment are unrelated, so that the difference
in earnings across parts is not meaningful.
13 This is because each base game has a unique equilibrium. In fact, if at the beginning of the first
phase, subjects had common knowledge about all aspects of the subsequent phase of the experi-
ment, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game could be computed, would also be
unique and correspond to the equilibrium in each phase of the experiment.
16 Maverick: Experimentally Testing a Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities 365
standard theory would predict. Specifically, assume that the entrant not only cares
about absolute profit but also about earning more than the competitors, and that this
is common knowledge.14 Then, like commitment power favoring the Stackelberg
leader, the rivalistic supplier sells a larger quantity than in a standard analysis of
the Cournot market, and the incumbents – if only interested in own gains – sell a
smaller quantity. Total quantity and thereby consumer welfare is larger than if all
suppliers hold standard preferences.15 This leads to
H1: If the entrant is rivalistic, she sells higher quantities and the market outcome is more
competitive.
We mention that we can derive the same hypothesis if we allow incumbents to be
rivalistic, too, as long as they are less rivalistic than the entrant (see Appendix I).
16.4 Experiment results
Figure 16.1 informs about the distribution of social value orientation in our sample.
We have 12 (13.64%) rivalistic, 27 (30.68%) selfish, and 49 (55.68%) participants
with a more or less pronounced positive social value orientation.16 Figure 16.1 also
shows our matching. Participants at the lower end of the distribution are entrants
in the Negative treatment. These are the subjects with the supposedly most competi-
tive behavior in oligopoly markets, and they are thus the focus of our study on the
impact of mavericks. Participants at the upper end of the distribution are entrants
in the Positive treatment. 11 participants with a social value orientation score of
zero are entrants in the Zero treatment. The remaining participants are randomly
14 This is a common assumption not only in large parts of the social preferences literature, but
also in the economics literature that does not address social preferences. The assumption simplifies
theoretical derivations, although it seems incorrect in most applications. However, in our setting
any rivalistic motivation leads to more aggressive bidding, regardless of the extent to which com-
petitors are (believed to be) rivalistic. In this sense, the general insight that rivalry leads to larger
quantities is robust.
15 We focus on consumer welfare for two reasons. Enhancing consumer welfare is the primary
stated goal of antitrust policy (Crandall and Winston 2003). Moreover we model mavericks as
agents holding social preferences, so that the definition of supply side welfare is not obvious. By
focusing on the opposite market side, we are able to bracket this debate in normative economic
theory.
16 Social value orientation scores range from – 56.23 (strongly rivalistic) to 74.55 (strongly averse
to advantageous inequity). If a participant chooses the allocation that gives her a higher payoff on
all 32 problems, her score is 0. A participant with a score of 45 always chooses the equal split. A
participant with a score of 90 is perfectly altruistic. A participant with a score of – 45 is willing to
give up 1 unit of her absolute profit to increase the payoff gap between herself an her random part-
ner by 1 unit. For the procedure for aggregating the 32 choices see Liebrand and McClintock (1988).
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assigned to being incumbents in either treatment. To make sure that the 16 selfish
incumbents are equally distributed across treatments, randomization is separate for
participants with a social value orientation score of 0, and for the remaining
incumbents.
As Figure 16.2 shows, overall quantity choices are fairly close to the standard
Cournot predictions. In duopoly markets, average quantity is close to 33. In triopoly
markets, it is close to 25. We thus provisionally support our null hypothesis H0.
Looking at average quantities only, social value orientation is not a plausible candi-
date for identifying maverick behavior. As suggested by Figure 16.2 and Table 16.1, if
we work with averages, we do not find treatment effects, neither non-parametrically
nor parametrically.17
This also holds if we confine the analysis to the last period before and the first pe-
riod after entry. Actually, descriptively in the Negative and in the Positive treatments,
entrants on average even sell less than incumbents and consequently make a lower
profit.
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Figure 16.1: Social value orientation per treatment and role.
17 For non-parametric estimation, we use a Mann-Whitney test, for parametric estimation the regression
as specified in Table 16.2, but of course without controlling for the average quantity in periods 1–10.
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Yet, as Figure 16.3 illustrates, aggregates per treatment conceal a more complex
story. In this figure, each marker is the mean quantity set by the two incumbents or
the entrant in one group. There is quite some variation that is hidden by looking at
averages only. In phase 1 of the Cournot market, quantity choices have mean 33.57,
but standard deviation 10.34. Quantity choices in the second phase of the experiment
heavily depend on experiences from the first phase. Independent of treatment, what
the group has experienced while the market was a duopoly is a strong predictor of
quantity choices after the entrance of the new competitor. Suppliers only adjust
quantities to reflect greater competition: the trend line is close to 75% of the average
quantity in the first 10 periods (which would be the quantity ratio of a triopoly com-
pared to a duopoly, as predicted by standard theory). As the distribution of hollow
(incumbents) versus solid markers (entrants) shows, market history matters for old
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Figure 16.2: Aggregate quantity choices.
Table 16.1: Descriptive statistics.
Phase  Phase 
neg zero pos neg zero pos
incumbent .
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
entrant .
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
Note: standard deviations in parenthesis
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and new market participants. We note that this history effect is in line with the only
other experiment we are aware of that tests market entry (Goppelsroeder 2009).
Overall, we can conclude that while there is a lot of idiosyncrasy regarding market
competitiveness, Nash equilibrium goes a long way to predict average quantities and
average differences of competitive pressure in our duopoly and triopoly settings.
The visual impression that local market competitiveness in periods 1–10 mat-
ters is supported by statistical analysis (see Table 16.2).18
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Figure 16.3: Dependence on local conditions.
Notes: x-axis: mean quantity sold by the two members of the duopoly, in periods 1–10
y-axis: mean quantity sold in periods 11–20
separately for incumbents (hollow markers) and for entrants (solid markers)
trend: linear prediction
Nash ratio: 3/4 of first phase quantity
18 We revert to regression analysis since we want to show that choices in periods 11–20 are ex-
plained by the average quantity this group had chosen before the third supplier enters the market.
We have data from choices, nested in individuals, nested in groups. Dependence within individuals
is captured by the random effect. The additional source of dependence at the group level is captured
by clustering standard errors at this level. The fact that the Hausman test does not turn out significant
shows that we are justified in preferring the more efficient random effects model over a model with
individual fixed effects. The coefficient of the average quantity in phase 1 is smaller than 0.75 since
the model has a constant. If we estimate the same model (as a population averaged regression) with-
out a constant, the coefficient comes very close to the theoretical expectation and is 0.714.
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This gives us:
Result 1: If a new competitor enters a repeated Cournot duopoly market, higher
pre-entry quantity is associated with higher post-entry quantity.
Knowing that local market conditions matter, we revisit the effects of our manipu-
lation in Table 16.3.19 The constant of the regression in Model 1 predicts the amount a
firm would sell in the Positive treatment if the average amount sold in this group in the
first 10 periods had been 0. Of course, as Figure 16.3 shows, in the experiment there
has been no such market. The regression generalizes to the population of Cournot du-
opolies observed by entrants. If we plug in the average amount sold in the first 10 peri-
ods from all 11 markets where the entrant has a positive social value orientation score
(32.973, Table 16.1), the regression predicts that, in the Positive treatment, firms on av-
erage sell 24.02 units,20 which comes pretty close to the Nash quantity of 25 units.
From the significant positive main effects of treatments Negative and Zero we
learn that, overall, the market is more competitive if the entrant is rivalistic or self-
ish, compared with a market where the entrant has a preference to avoid payoff dif-
ferences. Yet this treatment effect is indeed conditional on the competitiveness
before market entry. The significant negative interactions show that the translation
effect is most pronounced if the entrant has a positive social value orientation
Table 16.2: Effect of local conditions.
average quantity in periods – .***
(.)
Cons .**
(.)
N 
p model .
R within 
R between .
R overall .
Notes: dependent variable: quantity, data from
periods 11–20 random effects, robust standard
errors clustered at the group level Hausman test
insignificant on mirror model with period as
additional regressor (to enable fixed effects
estimation) standard errors in parenthesis * = p < .05
19 The fact that “overall” all models seem to explain little variance is an artefact of the fact that, by
their design, these models only explain between, not within variance.
20 .638 + 32.973 * .709 = 24.02.
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Table 16.3: Treatment effects conditional on local conditions.
periods –
all participants
period 
entrants only
model  model  model  model  model 
neg .***
(.)
.+
(.)
.**
(.)
.*
(.)
.*
(.)
zero .*
(.)
.
(.)
.*
(.)
.
(.)
.*
(.)
entrant −.
(.)
−.
(.)
neg*entrant .+
(.)
.+
(.)
zero*entrant .**
(.)
.**
(.)
average quantity in period  .
(.)
average quantity in phase  .***
(.)
.***
(.)
.**
(.)
.*
(.)
entrant*average quantity in phase  .
(.)
.
(.)
neg*average quantity in period  −.*
(.)
zero*average quantity in period  −.
(.)
neg*average quantity in phase  −.***
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.**
(.)
−.*
(.)
zero*average quantity in phase  −.*
(.)
−.
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.*
(.)
entrant*neg*average quantity in phase  −.+
(.)
−.+
(.)
entrant*zero*average quantity in phase  −.**
(.)
−.**
(.)
entrant SVO .*
(.)
average quantity in phase *entrant SVO −.*
(.)
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score. The more the market was competitive pre-entry, the less it becomes even
more competitive through the entry of a new competitor with rivalistic or selfish
preferences. In fact, the pro-competitive effect of the entrant holding rivalistic pref-
erences only plays itself out if the average quantity pre-entry was at or below 31
units21; recall that the Nash quantity for the duopoly is 33 units. Likewise, if the en-
trant is selfish, entry only has a pro-competitive effect if the average quantity pre-
entry was at or below 36 units.22 Yet in both treatments, the pro-competitive effect
of entry is pronounced if the duopoly was perfectly collusive. The model predicts
that quantity is 3.752 units higher if a rivalistic firm enters a collusive market, and
3.839 units higher if a selfish firm enters.23
Model 2 splits the analysis by entrants and incumbents. The picture nicely
clears if, in model 3, we additionally control for the precise social value orientation
score of the entrant, and how it interacts with the competitiveness of the market
before she enters. The following discussion focuses on this model. The implications
are easiest to see in the marginal effect of the Negative and Zero treatments that are
reported in Figure 16.4. If we find a significantly positive effect of treatment, the
Table 16.3 (continued)
periods –
all participants
period 
entrants only
Cons .
(.)
.
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.
(.)
−.
(.)
N     
p model <. <. <. . .
R within   
R between . . .
R overall . . . . .
Notes: regression equations for all models in Appendix II dependent variable: quantity models 1–3:
data from periods 11–20, models 4–5: data from period 11 models 1–3: data from incumbents and
entrants, models 4–5: data from entrants only models 1–3: random effects, robust standard errors
clustered at the group level Hausman test insignificant on mirror models with period as additional
regressor (to enable fixed effects estimation) SVO: social value orientation, i.e. score from ring
measure test treatment: reference category: positive standard errors in parenthesis *** p < .001, **
p < .01, * = p < .05, + p < .1
21 19.427/.627 = 30.984.
22 12.664/.353 = 35.875.
23 19.427–25*.627 = 3.752; 12.664–25*.353 = 3.839.
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rivalistic or selfish personality of the entrant has a pro-competitive effect. This
holds true for both treatments and roles, but only if, pre-entry, the market was col-
lusive.24 With this qualification, we reject our null hypothesis H0 and infer that the
alternative hypothesis H1 captures the data. We also note that the asymmetric re-
sponse of selfish (Zero) and rivalistic (Negative) entrants to their observations from
the first 10 periods is well in line with their playing best responses, assuming that
incumbents will only adjust to the fact that one more supplier enters the market
(but not reach equilibrium choices themselves). In the Appendix I we show this
formally.25
To see whether the social preferences of entrants are indeed critical, we consider
period 11 in isolation, i.e. the first period after entry. Overall, and if we confine the
analysis to incumbents, we do not find any treatment effects, even if we interact
treatment with the average quantity chosen in the respective group in period 10 (i.e.
directly before entry), or during all of periods 1–10. But we do see a strong effect of
the Negative treatment if we separately analyze choices of entrants (Model 4 of
Table 16.3). We also see an effect of the Zero treatment if we replace average choices
in period 10 with average choices in periods 1–10 (Model 5 of Table 16.3). Recall that
incumbents had no information about the criterion for selecting entrants. Models 4
and 5 not only show that our manipulation worked. Together with Models 1–3 we
also see how a maverick changes the market: immediately after entry, she behaves
according to her preferences; in later periods, incumbents react to this experience.
Thus far our data suggest that a rivalistic and a selfish entrant have pretty
much the same effect on competitiveness. To see whether this is indeed true, we
use the following approach: individually for each incumbent we regress quantities
sold in the first phase on time. This procedure gives us for each individual incum-
bent the trend, had there not been entry. From these regressions, for each individ-
ual we derive an out of sample prediction for the remaining 10 periods. We adjust
the predicted quantity to the market entry of one more supplier by multiplying it by
the theoretically predicted ratio of ¾ (see above). Note that the prediction is flat if,
pre entry, the market had already reached equilibrium. However, inspecting the
raw data, it seems that most duopoly markets had not yet stabilized. Only 17 of 62
incumbents did not change the quantity over periods 6–10.
Figure 16.5 shows the difference, per treatment and period, between the mean
actual and predicted quantity. In the Positive treatment, actual quantities are much
higher than the prediction. In the Zero treatment, actual quantities exhibit more
variance, but have about the same level as the prediction. By contrast in the
Negative treatment, and only in this treatment, for all periods but the final actual
24 The marginal effects of Figure 16.4 also explain the seemingly contradictory descriptive finding
that, in the Negative treatment, entrants on average choose smaller quantities than incumbents,
Table 16.1: entrants only bid more than incumbents if the market had been collusive.
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
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quantities are below the predicted trend.26 We conclude that, depending on the so-
cial preferences of the entrant, incumbents come under additional competitive pres-
sure and react by reducing the quantity they sell, as predicted by our model.
Overall, this gives us:
Result 2: Conditional on pre-entry local market competitiveness, a Cournot market
is more competitive if the entrant is rivalistic.
In the final step, we want to understand in which ways rivalistic entrants disci-
pline incumbents. To that end we take a closer look at dynamics in the Negative
treatment. The dependent variable is changes in incumbents’ choices from one pe-
riod to the next.
Model 1 of Table 16.4 shows that incumbents, on average, reduce their own con-
tributions in reaction to high contributions of the entrant (p = .088), as predicted by
our theory. The weakly significant interaction effect (p = .099) indicates that the ef-
fect is the more pronounced the more the market was collusive before the third sup-
plier entered. Model 2 and the marginal effects reported in Figure 16.6 show that
the effect requires some degree of discord among the incumbents though.27 If the
standard deviation of quantity choices in this group and every period of phase 1
was low on average (range [2.828, 7.778]), incumbents do not significantly reduce
their quantity in reaction to a high quantity sold by the entrant. This suggests that a
duopoly that has successfully established a common norm of behavior is more resil-
ient to attempts of a maverick to break up collusion; indeed, previous research has
shown that homogeneous cooperation across agents is less vulnerable to being de-
stabilized (e.g. Brosig, Weimann, and Ockenfels 2003).
16.5 Conclusion
Antitrust authorities are not only concerned with market power. They are also atten-
tive to firm-specific heterogeneity in market behavior. They are particularly pleased if
26 The visual impression is supported by statistical analysis. If we regress the difference between
the actual quantity and the out of sample prediction on treatment, and choose the Negative treat-
ment as reference category, the constant informs us about the treatment effect for this treatment. If
we use all 10 periods of the second phase, the constant is – 1.641, but not significantly different
from zero (p = .151). If we repeat the analysis for periods 11–19, however, the constant is – 2.392, p =
.002, which supports our claim. In neither regression, the net effect of constant + treatment Zero is
significantly different from zero (p = .9016 in the first and p = .8519 in the second regression). We
do, however, acknowledge that the treatment effect diminishes over time. If we repeat the regres-
sion, now interact treatment with period, and subsequently test the net effect of the constant + pe-
riod, the result is significantly different from zero for periods 11–16 only. The additional regressions
are available from the authors upon request.
27 Further controlling for the mean quantity sold individually by each incumbent, or replacing the
standard deviation with this measure, does not yield significant effects.
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they identify especially aggressive firms. In this paper we experimentally investigate
a cause for such “maverick” behavior that transcends pecuniary incentives: an indi-
vidual may derive utility from relative, not only from absolute payoff.
In our experiment, we do indeed find that market entry by a participant with a
particularly rivalistic attitude makes the market more competitive, improving con-
sumer welfare and hampering incumbents’ profits. Yet this result only holds condi-
tional on the level of competition pre-entry. The entry of a “maverick” is socially
most beneficial when it is most needed, i.e. when the market was collusive. This
suggests that mavericks can play an important role for entertaining competitive
markets, and so competition authorities may be indeed well-advised to appreciate
this role in their policies.28
We of course do not claim a one to one mapping of the behavior of students in
the lab (which we test) to the behavior of firms in markets. Firms are highly aggregate
Table 16.4: Reaction of incumbents to quantity choices of entrants in neg treatment.
model  model 
quantity sold by entrant in t- −.+
(.)
.+
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*average quantity in phase  .+
(.)
−.+
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*standard deviation of average
quantity in phase 
−.*
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*average quantity in phase *standard
deviation of average quantity in phase 
.*
(.)
cons .
(.)
−.
(.)
N  
R within . .
R between . .
R overall . .
Notes: dv: quantity(t) – quantity(t-1) of incumbents data from neg treatment individual fixed
effects, since Hausman test turns out significant robust standard errors, clustered for groups, in
parenthesis *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * = p < .05, + p < .1
28 The fact that we do not have even stronger findings might also result from the composition of
our sample. In line with previous experimental results (Liebrand and McClintock 1988), only a mi-
nority of our participants is willing to give up some income for increasing the distance in payoff to
their favor. With one exception, even those who do are only mildly rivalistic.
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corporate actors (for a survey of the experimental research specifically addressing
such actors see Engel 2010), and decision making is rarely individual but rather
based on some aggregation of team preferences; suppliers in a real market of three
do not interact anonymously and underlying preferences of both, incumbents and
mavericks may be subject to selection effects; and markets are differently organized
and structured – to name only some obvious simplifications. But in line with a rich
literature on experimental oligopoly markets (see the meta-study by Engel 2015) we
believe that such evidence provides a useful starting point for analyzing the behavior
of firms. Eventually, individuals decide for firms. It is therefore not unlikely that be-
havioral traits of these individuals carry over to the behavior of the firms for whom
they act. Managers are not only selected for their competence and connections, but
also for their personalities. It is not unlikely that a firm selects particularly aggressive
individuals if it intends to act aggressively in the market. Moreover, firms as corpo-
rate entities may themselves, in different degrees, care about relative, not only about
absolute payoff. One reason is the embeddedness of some firms into financial mar-
kets, possibly also into a market for corporate control. In these markets, comparative
performance may be a very relevant signal, whereas in other markets that might be
less so.
That said, an experiment will not be able to settle the policy debate over mav-
ericks. Experiments are only tools for identifying potential effects. But we add an
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Figure 16.6: Reaction of incumbents to quantity choices of entrants in neg treatment.
Notes: marginal effects of 1 unit lagged increase in entrant’s quantity on change in incumbents’
quantity from model 2 of Table 16.4
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important argument to this policy debate. Maverick choices may be expected, they
may be sustainable, and they may affect market outcomes, even in the absence of a
pecuniary incentive to act aggressively. Anti-trust authorities have no reason to
stop searching for, or protecting, maverick behavior, even if it does not seem to be
grounded in sound profit incentives of the firm in question.
A second finding is of even greater importance for anti-trust policy: maverick
behavior is not to be expected irrespective of context. When they face tough compe-
tition, even individuals (firms) otherwise inclined to compete aggressively are likely
to hold back. We have of course only shown this for maverick behavior resulting
from rivalistic preferences. But one should a fortiori expect a disciplining effect of a
competitive environment on mavericks that have an incentive to outperform others
(for instance since their income is tied to market share): by definition, maverick be-
havior reduces absolute profit. For anti-trust, this insight matters in merger control.
Not so rarely, mergers between conglomerate firms reduce competition in one, but
increase competition in another market. In principle, it makes sense to balance out
these effects. But if the merger enables entry into a new market and competition in
this market is intense, the merger is unlikely to increase consumer welfare, even if
the entrant has an incentive to bid aggressively.
Appendix I: Model
In the general case of a Cournot market with linear demand, intercept m, and n sup-
pliers, all with marginal cost of zero, the Cournot-Nash quantity is given by:
qi =
m
n+ 1
We now assume that the utility of the rivalistic supplier e (given that the other two
suppliers make identical profits πi, which will be the case in equilibrium) is given
by ue = πe + n− 1ð Þγ πe − πið Þ
= 1+ 2γð Þ m− n− 1ð Þqi − qeð Þqe − 2γ m− n− 1ð Þqi − qeð Þqi
Profit for one of the incumbents is now given by
πi = m− qi − n− 2ð Þqj − qe
 
qi
Taking first order conditions, and solving the resulting system of equations, we get
qi = qj =
m 2γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ , qe =
m 4γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
E.g., with the parameters of the experiment, and letting the entrant be mildly rival-
istic, i.e. with γ= 12, we get qi = qj = 22.22, qe = 33.33. The rivalistic player is better off
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the larger γ, that is the more she is rivalistic. If all sellers hold standard preferences,
in equilibrium they sell QN = nqi = nmn+ 1 units. If one seller is rivalistic, total quantity
is given by
QR = n− 1ð Þ m 2γ+ 1ð Þ2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ +
m 4γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
which is larger than QN for any γ>0; with γ=0,QR =QN . Hence consumer welfare
increases if there is a rivalistic player.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we also allow incumbents to be ri-
valistic as shown below, if we keep the assumption that the entrant is more rivalis-
tic γe ≥ γi
 
.29 Specifically, let us assume that α= γi < γe = γ. Taking first order
conditions, and solving the resulting system of equations, we get
qi = qj =
m 4αγ+ 2α+ 2γ+ 1ð Þ
4αγn+ 2αn+ 2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ ,
qk =
m 4αγ+ α+ 4γ+ 1ð Þ
4αγn+ 2αn+ 2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
Similar to our previous results, each incumbent sells less than the entrant, and con-
sumer welfare increases both in α and γ.
Our hypotheses are based on the assumption that preferences are common
knowledge, and that all suppliers maximize utility. This is not what we find in the
experiment. Visibly many duopolies are out of equilibrium, and entrants react to
this. We therefore also report best responses of entrants, assuming that incumbents
will only adjust quantities to the entry of one more supplier (i.e. will choose
q3 = .75*q2, where numbers 2 and 3 stand for the number of suppliers). If the entrant
maximizes profit (is selfish), she will then choose the following best response
qe br =
1
2
m− n− 1ð Þ.75*q2ð Þ
or, with the parameters of the experiment, 50− .75*q2. Note that, if the duopoly was
in equilibrium, 75*q2 = 25, so that the best response is the equilibrium. Hence the
29 In fact, the result can be generalized by noting that our model is related to the model by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). The difference is that the Fehr-Schmidt model allows players to also suffer
from advantageous inequality. However, as long as the entrant is assumed to be more aggressive
than the incumbents, the incumbents will in equilibrium always fall behind the entrant and so
never experience advantageous inequality. Since the utility from the difference between one’s own
payoff and the payoff of a peer is not constrained to positive differences, our utility also captures
disutility from falling behind one’s peers. So, technically, this leads to a market of n players who all
hold preferences as we assume above.
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model predicts that entrants choose a larger quantity only if the duopoly was collu-
sive. This fits the data from the Zero treatment very well, Figure 16.4.
If entrants are rivalistic, the best response to the expectation that incumbents
will only adjust to the fact that one more supplier is in the market is given by maxi-
mizing the utility, assuming q3 = .75*q2. In generic notation the best response is
given by
qe br =
m+ n− 1ð Þ.75*q2 + n− 1ð Þγ m− n− 2ð Þ.75*q2ð Þ
2+ 2n− 2ð Þγ
With the parameters of the experiment, this simplifies to
qe br =
50− .75*q2 + 100− .75*q2ð Þγ
1+ 2γ
Note that this quantity is below the Nash quantity for large q2 and/or for small γ.
This fits the results from Figure 16.4 very well.
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Appendix III: Instructions
a) Instructions: First session
(1) General instructions
Thank you for taking part in our experiment. From your invitation you already
know that the experiment is in two parts. These instructions explain the first part of
the experiment, taking place today. We will pay you your earnings from today’s
part of the experiment at the end of today’s session. However, it is very important
for our experiment that you also participate in the second session.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you
in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please switch off your mobile phone now, and please do not communicate any
longer with the other participants as of this moment. Should you have a question
about the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer
your query.
Today’s part of the experiment consists of different sections. In these instruc-
tions, we explain the first section. For the following sections, you will find your in-
structions on the screen in front of you.
In order for us to keep track of your performance in the second part of the ex-
periment, we would ask you please to generate an identification code at the end of
the experiment, and to enter this code on your computer screen. We will use this
identification code to connect your data from the first and second parts of the ex-
periment. At no time do we know your name or address. Only the laboratory admin-
istration has that information. However, the laboratory administration does not
know your decisions. This way we can ensure that anonymity is guaranteed at all
times. Please write down this number and bring it with you when you are invited
to the second experiment. At the beginning of the the second experiment, we will
ask you to enter this number on your computer screen. If you enter the wrong
number, you cannot take part in the second experiment. Therefore, please
check whether you have made a note of the correct number.
(2) First section
We are now going to ask you to make several decisions. For this to happen, you will
be randomly matched with another participant. You can allocate Taler to this par-
ticipant and to yourself in the course of several distribution decisions. In order to
do this, you will have to choose repeatedly between two distributions, X and Y
(e.g., distribution X: 10 Taler for yourself and 12 Taler for the other player; and dis-
tribution Y: 8 Taler for yourself and 20 Taler for the other player). The Taler you
allocate to yourself are paid out to you at the end of the experiment, at a rate of 100
Taler = 1 €. At the same time, you are also randomly matched with yet another exper-
iment participant who, in turn, can allocate Taler by way of distribution decisions.
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This participant is not the same as the one to whom you can allocate Taler. The
Taler allocated to you are also transferred to your account and paid out to you at the
end of the experiment, at a rate of 100 Taler = 1 €.
The individual decision tasks will look like this:
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[translation of screenshot
Period 1 of 1
Task
Please choose your preferred distribution of Taler.
Possibility A
Possibility B
Your Taler
The Taler of the participant matched with you]
b) Instructions: Second session
(1) General instructions
Welcome to the experiment! This is the second part of the experiment. The first part
took place a few days ago. We would like to thank you for showing up once again.
Please enter your identification number on your screen now. Let us remind you that
we will not connect this number with your name and your address. You will there-
fore remain anonymous for both today’s experiment and the earlier one. Your num-
ber will be used exclusively to relate your decisions from both experiments to you.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of other participants.
Please switch off your mobile phone now, and please do not communicate any
longer with the other participants as of this moment. Should you have a question
about the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer
your query.
This experiment is in three parts. You will find the instructions for the first part
below. The instructions for the following parts will be handed out to you after the
respective previous parts have been completed. As we will explain to you later on,
participants can take on different roles in the course of the experiment.
Each of these parts consists of several rounds. All rounds of all parts are payoff-
relevant. In this experiment, we use the Experimental Currency Unit ECU. All sums
in ECU are always rounded off to whole numbers. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all ECU contributions is converted into Euro at a rate of 2000 ECU = 1 €.
The converted sum will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
You will remain in a group of three participants for the duration of the entire
experiment. The constellation of the group does not change.
All decisions in this experiment, as well as the payoffs at the end, remain anon-
ymous. Please do not discuss these with any of the other participants, even when
the experiment has ended.
(2) Instructions: First part
CAUTION: One-third of the participants pauses in this part of the experiment and
will not continue until the second part. However, these participants are also
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informed about what is happening. We will inform you at the beginning of the ex-
periment about the role you have in the first part.
This part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round, two partici-
pants are actors in a market. Both participants produce an identical product at no
production costs. At the beginning of each round, each producer chooses the
amount he or she wishes to produce. The market price (P), at which each unit is
sold on the market, depends on the total amount (Q) produced by both participants.
The market price is calculated as follows:
P = 100−Q false Q< 100
0 else

This means, first of all, that both producers receive the same market price for their
amounts. Secondly, the higher the total amount Q is that both producers sell, the
lower is the market price. As of a total amount of 100, the market price equals zero.
For each of the two producers, the payoff for the round is his or her chosen pro-
duction amount, multiplied by the market price. The total payoff for this part of the
experiment is the sum of all individual payoffs per round.
After each round, you will receive feedback on the amount the producers have
chosen in total, on the market price, and on your earnings.
(3) Instructions: Second part
This part of the experiment consists of a 10-round market, just like the first part.
The only difference now is that there is a further producer, in addition to the two
“older” producers. The “new producer” has paused in the first part of the experi-
ment, but received the same instructions as the two other producers, for the pur-
pose of information. In addition, this new producer has also been informed about
the market prices and amounts of the past ten rounds, concerning the group this
new producer has joined.
Apart from the fact that there are now three producers, nothing else changes.
As before, the market price is calculated for all three producers – the two old and
the new – using the same formula:
P = 100−Q if Q< 100
0 else

This means all three producers receive the same market price P for their amounts,
and that the market price that can be attained falls proportionally to the total
amount Q rising.
(4) Instructions: Third part
This part of the experiment consists of a further continuation of the market by an
additional ten rounds. However, both the two old producers who were active in the
first part and the new producer who joined the market in the second part have the
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opportunity to negotiate a possible departure of the new producer from the market.
Negotiations are conducted according to the following rules.
Independently of the second producer, each of the two old producers names a
maximum price figure, in ECU, which he or she would pay the new producer if this
producer were prepared, in return, to quit the game for the additional ten rounds.
However, the highest possible price that the two old producers can name is the fig-
ure you have earned in the first two parts of the experiment.
At the same time, the new producer names a figure B (in ECU), beginning with
which he or she is willing to forfeit participation in the additional ten market rounds.
Then, one of the two offers made by the old producers is chosen randomly, with
each offer having a 50-percent chance of being chosen. There are two possibilities:
– If the maximum offer A of the old producer who has been chosen is at least as
high as the new producer’s demand B, then the old producer who has been cho-
sen pays the new producer demand B. (Offer A hence describes the chosen old
producer’s maximum willingness to pay; usually, less is paid.) Then, the addi-
tional ten market rounds take place without the new producer – as in the first
part of the experiment.
– If the maximum offer A of the old producer who has been chosen is smaller than
the new producer’s demand B, then the additional ten market rounds take place
with the new producer – as in the second part of the experiment. In this case, there
is no exchange of any payment between the chosen old and the new producer.
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